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Bartleby’s Preference: Res Ipsa Loquitur
Matthew Guillen
I muse upon my country's ills-
The Tempest bursting from the waste of Time
On the world's fairest hope linked with man's
foulest crime.1
1 Herman Melville’s short story, “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street”, published
in  late  1853,  involves  a  law clerk  whose  job  profile  -  that  of  “scrivener”-  in  reality
comprised a wide range of menial writing assignments: from the standardized drawing up
of bills, bonds, deeds, leases, etc. to the mechanical copying of documents.2 Compared to
the others, Bartleby is described by the lawyer narrator as the model employee: “His
steadiness, his freedom from all dissipation, his incessant industry […], his great stillness,
his  unalterableness  of  demeanor  under  all  circumstances,  made  him  a  valuable
acquisition.”(41) This, even after the scrivener has begun stating his “preference” not to
perform certain tasks - thus maneuvering the lawyer, after weighing the costs against the
benefits of such an arrangement, into contriving for himself a satisfactory, since overall
financially convenient, resignation: “[I]t was exceedingly difficult to bear in mind all the
time those strange peculiarities, privileges, and unheard-of exemptions, forming the tacit
stipulations on Bartleby’s part under which he remained in my office.” (42)
2 For our purposes, one observation is particularly apt. In “‘Bartleby the Scrivener,’ Poe,
and the Duyckinck Circle” Daniel  Wells  unravels Melville’s  and Poe’s  relationships to
Evert Duyckinck who, along with his brother, edited The Literary World and contributed to
what has come to be known as the Knickerbocker convention of New York writing. Wells
takes care to distinguish Melville and Edgar Allan Poe, to whose style “Bartleby” had been
likened in a note in The Literary World's column of “Literature, Books of the Week, Etc.”--
mentioning the story as a “Poeish tale”3--adding that although both writers can make a
reader feel and share the desperate loneliness of a man, whether he be a “man of the
crowd” or a Bartleby, the latter's loneliness has no terror in it but rather “disciplined
dignity.”4 
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3 It will be suggested that elements of Wells’ notion of “disciplined dignity” are controlling
throughout the story, but to conflicting ends depending on the professional canon: in the
case of the narrator, discipline and dignity bind one to the letter of the law; in the case of
the artist, these traits release the pen beyond the four corners of the page, and the world,
beyond marginalia, into the unspeakable--or, resting within legal terminology, res ipsa
loquitur--“the thing speaks for itself”. 
4 In current legal usage, this notion occurs in cases involving the liability of manufacturers
for defects in the products they sell. The underlying notion of “the self-explanatory” has
the  practical  effect  of  not  requiring  an  injured  plaintiff  to  spend  a  fortune  hiring
engineers  to  perform  sophisticated  laboratory  testing  in  order  to  prove  that  his
automobile tires would not have exploded after two weeks of ordinary driving but for
negligence on the part of the manufacturer. This notion translates into a reduction of
legal cost and, most significantly, paperwork--the literary equivalent being silence on
subjects which lengthy articulation might render less powerful. 
5 As such, after his retreat into silence, Melville’s job as customs inspector may be said to
have constituted a Zen-like hovering above the real, described by R.H. Stoddard as “an
asylum  for  nonentities”5,  an  observation  in  keeping  with  Mumford’s  biographical
correspondences between Melville, whose personal life teemed with members of the legal
profession, and the scrivener:
By  his  persistence  in  minding  his  own  spiritual  affairs,  those  who  might  have
helped him on their own terms, like Allan [Melville's lawyer brother] or his father-
in-law [Lemuel Shaw] or his Uncle Peter [Gansevoort],  inevitably became a little
impatient; for in the end, they foresaw they would be obliged to throw him off, and
he would find himself in prison, not in the visible prison for restraining criminals,
but in the pervasive prison of dull routine and meaningless activity.6
 
A. The Lawyer
6 The  lawyer  who  narrates  “Bartleby”,  “a  rather  elderly  man,”  considers  his  multiple
contacts with scriveners, whose “divers histories” might make “good natured gentlemen
smile” and “sentimental souls weep,” a part of his avocation. From the beginning he
appears  to  be  a  disinterested  observer  who  collects  the  eccentric  stories  of  clerical
laborers. Bartleby is a prize specimen in his collection, since the lawyer alone through
personal observation knows what little is ascertainable about Bartleby. 
7 Nicolas Ayo suggests that the lawyer’s attitude toward his several employees appears to
be almost entirely utilitarian. He keeps them to the extent they prove useful to him.
Nipper suffers under the mechanical and thoughtless routine of a human copy-machine.
Muscle tension makes him irritable, and the six-day week compounds his difficulty. His
employer, however, judges Nippers to be too “ambitious.” Similarly, after giving a coat to
Turkey to make his appearance more presentable for business reasons, he concludes that
new clothes breed only “insolence.” Turkey becomes “a man whom prosperity harmed.”
Ginger Nut, the office boy of twelve years of age, works for a dollar a week, and the
drawer to his desk is not considered private. Upon acquiring more business, the lawyer
determines, “not only must I push the clerks already with me, but I must have additional
help”  (23).  In  short,  “the  employer  seems exclusively  productivity-minded and quite
willing  to  manipulate  and  exploit  his  employees  for  his  own  ends,  according  to  a
business-is-business  ethic.”7 This  portrayal  is  much  in  keeping  with  the  prevailing
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consensus of the day concerning the legal profession’s ethically dubious practices.  As
stated by David Dudley Field, referring to the State of New York:
What,  then,  is  to  be  said  of  the  lawyers?  […]  English  literature  from  time
immemorial has teemed with scoffs at attorneys:  on the stage they have always
been  represented  as  fraudulent  tricksters;  Dickens  has  made  Dodson  and  Fogg
immortal as types of experts in chicane; and in our state, so long ago as 1818, a
statute was passed indirectly  imputing to lawyers the practice of  buying claims
with intent to bring suits upon them, and prohibiting such purchases in future.8
8 Sculley Bradley argues that, on the contrary, the narrator constitutes an exception to the
rule--demonstrated by his being won over to Bartleby's side : “the gradual unfolding of
the lawyer's human understanding, responding to Bartleby's passive resistance against all
that he is or serves, until he is on Bartleby's side--this theme is perhaps central.”9 And
Leo Marx proposes that at the end in the Tombs, where life, in terms of sky and earth, can
still be appreciated, grace is given only to the lawyer--who alone is “aware of the grass
and to whom, therefore, the meaning is finally granted.” 10
9 However, should biographical correspondences hold, a particularly benign portrayal of a
New York lawyer would evidence a rupture with received tradition. The fact remains that
the New York legal community was rife with scandal throughout the nineteenth century,
prompting Thomas Shearman to write on the topic of lawyers keeping for themselves
bribes their clients had entrusted them to “satisfy the judge” thereby ensuring their
“share of the public plunder”:
It  can  scarcely  be  necessary  to  point  out  the  demoralizing  effect  of  judicial
corruption upon the criminal classes of society. They learn to rely upon the profits
of their depredations for immunity; and when justice finally overtakes them, the
predominant conviction of their minds is that they are only punished because their
money  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  the  judge.  […]  Many  of  them  have  paid  the
required bribe to their “lawyer,” who has never troubled himself to offer it to the
judge; and such men naturally go to prison with hearts full of rage and suspicion,
not knowing whom to blame, and therefore cursing the whole world […] the process
which is now going on debauches the public conscience almost as much as it robs
the public purse. Every successive reaction is fainter. Efforts were made in 1853,
1857, 1863, and 1865 to stem the current, and each time with less energy, less unity,
and less effect.  Even the most respectable classes are growing callous.  They are
satisfied that corruption is inevitable, and in many instances are only anxious that
their party should have its share of the public plunder... 11
10 The narrator is a former Master of the New York Court of Chancery--a post which, at the
moment of narration, has ceased to exist but which the lawyer presumably still occupied
at the time the events surrounding his scrivener unfolded. The name derives from the
Court of the Lord Chancellor in England, the highest court of judicature next to the House
of Lords.12 Originally, this Court consisted of two tribunals, one of which dealt with the
issuance of Parliamentary and Common Law writs, the second of which proceeded upon
rules of equity and conscience, hence moderating the severity of the Common Law, and
giving relief in cases where there was no remedy in the other court--the equivalent of a
modern-day Court  of  Appeals.  In America,  Courts  of  Chancery dealt  exclusively  with
equity issues and were set up to protect natural rights against strict adherence to the
written  law.  As  Master,  Bartleby’s  employer  would  have  had  to  decide  each  case
expediently,  collecting  fees  regardless  of  the  outcome.  The  potential  for  abuse  was
evident, and in many cases, lengthy litigation kept property from being transferred to its
rightful heirs. 
Bartleby’s Preference: Res Ipsa Loquitur
Journal of the Short Story in English, 37 | 2008
3
11 The narrator’s anger, which he seldom indulges “in dangerous indignation at wrongs and
outrages,” is vented upon the supposedly unjust repeal of this outdated sinecure, whose
profits  he  had  counted  upon  for  a  “life-lease.”  The  new  State  Constitution,  which
abolished  the  chancery  office,  is  judged  to  have  acted  with  a  “sudden  and  violent
abrogation,”--inappropriate invectives, issuing from a respectable lawyer, for democratic
constitutional  changes.  Apparently  he  had  received  the  appointment  of  Master  in
Chancery not long before hiring Bartleby, and the new man was to assist his two copyists
in the work of his added responsibilities. Courts of chancery, however, had in fact come to
be perceived as aristocratic and patriarchal, and were abolished in New York with the
adoption of a new constitution in 1846, and a new field code in 1848--the year of the death
of John Jacob Astor--a man whose name “rings like unto bullion” for the narrator: 13 
The late John Jacob Astor, a personage little given to poetic enthusiasm, had no
hesitation in pronouncing my first grand point to be prudence; my next, method. I
do not speak it in vanity, but simply record the fact, that I was not unemployed in
my profession by the late John Jacob Astor; a name which, I admit, I love to repeat,
for it hath a rounded and orbicular sound to it, and rings like unto bullion. I will
freely add, that I was not insensible to the late John Jacob Astor's good opinion.
12 The lawyer’s complaint would thus have held topical interest for Melville’s first readers.
So would, perhaps, the fact that courts of chancery had served Astor well in his real estate
dealings, especially in the frequent mortgage foreclosures of the later period of his life.14
His rhetoric contains a humility that rings false: "not unemployed" by John Jacob Astor and
"not insensible" to his good opinion. Explaining the allusion to John Jacob Astor, Mario
D'Avanzo claims that the lawyer's proud identification with the “First Man of Wall Street”
fits nicely into the theme of the story as a parable of the artist.  Astor, he continues,
exploited  writers,  particularly  Washington  Irving,  so  the  great  “patron”  of  art  and
founder of the library in which Melville read so many times epitomizes the pretentious
society “which […] has little use,  need, or respect for a literature which dives to the
philosophical deeps […]”.15James C. Wilson also connects the lawyer-narrator with Astor,
concluding that in Bartleby Melville “by his use of anironic, self-justifying narrator in




13 Keith  Huntress,  among  others,  has  suggested  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court  Justice
Lemuel  Shaw,  and his  extreme pro-Federalist  industrial  expansion policies  and their
subsequent  integration  in  his  court  decisions,  as  model  for  the  lawyer-narrator  in
“Bartleby”.17 Shaw, Melville’s father-in-law as well as lifelong benefactor, was seventy-
two when “Bartleby”was first published, and he had been a successful lawyer and judge
for nearly half a century. For Marcus, Bartleby “appears to the lawyer chiefly to remind
him of the inadequacies, the sterile routine, of his world”.18 And one might well imagine
parallels  to the Shaw-Melville  relationship.   The lawyer in “Bartleby” prizes comfort,
finding “the easiest way of life is the best” and thus abandoning the stress accompanying
more  ambitious  legal  practice.   Robert  Gale  states:  “In  a  way  he  [Shaw]  too  was
unambitious, since in 1830 he had given up his opulent practice for the lesser-paying
judgeship.”19 Further, his high pay as a lawyer had involved no turbulent addresses to
juries but instead corporate work, which was indeed “very pleasantly remunerative.”20 
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14 Through landmark rulings by Justice Shaw, workers--typically, railroad workers--came to
be expected to “assume the risks” attached to their jobs, risks which in turn flowed from
government  incentives  to  unrestrained industrial  growth.  In  other  words,  employers
could  not  be  held  “accountable,”  in  Shaw’s  own phrasing,  for  accidents  incurred by
workers on the job-hence denying workmen’s compensation for any injuries sustained.21
In Farwell v. Boston. and Worcester Railroad, Shaw held that employers are not liable for
injuries that one worker negligently inflicts on another during the course of employment.
22 This decision, like many others he wrote, protected industry, and its value as legal
precedent had much to do with the delay of Workmen's Compensation until 1910, when
New York passed the first such act, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
1911,23 and only after extended emendations, permitted by the Court in 1917.24 
15 The theme of “accountability” occurs in a dialogue between the narrator and another
lawyer, who accuses the narrator of shirking his responsibility for Bartleby’s actions--
effectively raising the Common Law doctrine of Respondeat Superior (charging the Master
with responsibility for the actions of his Servant), which, incidentally, Shaw disavowed as
controlling in Farwell, since the railroad was held not responsible for injuries inflicted by
one employee on another:
“Then, sir,” said the stranger, who proved a lawyer, “you are responsible for the
man you left there […]” “I am very sorry, sir, “ said I, with assumed tranquility, but
an inward tremor, “but, really, the man you allude to is nothing to me—he is no
relation or apprentice of mine, that you should hold me responsible for him.” (66) 
16 This  second lawyer,  less  timid than the narrator,  has Bartleby taken to the city jail,
euphemistically called the Halls of Justice and more commonly known as the Tombs.
James Wilson remarks that the lawyer-narrator had earlier likened Wall Street to Petra,
“which was the ancient capital of Edom and famous for its Hellenistic tombs carved in
rock. Thus the lawyer equates Wall Street with the jail: both are tombs.”25 The narrator
has refused accountability--reasonably--yet recognizes the doctrine’s moral implications
with “an inward tremor.” 
17 Enunciated in Farwell  v.  Boston and Worcester  RR,  the doctrine of  “assumption of  risk”
negating employer “accountability” was almost singularly responsible for a legal trend
which made it incumbent on the injured party to prove that the harm could have been
avoided--a very difficult and, more to the point, costly thing for the ordinary workingman
to do and of undisputed advantage to business and industry. Corporate liability quickly
came  to  be  far  reduced  even  as  the  lot  of  the  average  wage  earner  became  more
precarious--in terms of physical injury in the workspace as well as tragedies incurred
through job loss during the economic panics of 1837 and 1857. 
18 Shaw’s “assumption” was scarcely original and can be traced to an English case, Priestly v.
Fowler (1837), decided by Lord Abinger.26 The suit was brought by a butcher’s employee
who had been hurt in the thigh when the butcher’s van, overloaded, broke down.  It had
obviously little to do with industrial accidents as such, but later courts on both sides of
the Atlantic picked up the rule in railroad cases. In a famous remark in the House of
Commons  in  1897,  the  secretary  for  Ireland  stated:  “Lord  Abinger  planted  it,  Baron
Alderson watered it, and the devil gave it increase.”27 Sir Edward Hall Alderson was an
English judge who further developed this doctrine. In the United States, meanwhile, one
may substitute Justice Shaw for Alderson, “watering” the doctrine through 1842’s Farwell,
which was then to be cited as dispositive for 411 negligence cases.  
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19 In “Melville, Lemuel Shaw, and ‘Bartleby’,” John Stark has detailed Melville’s frequent
contacts  with  Shaw  (particularly  during  the  period  Melville  took  up  residence  near
Pittsfield,  Massachusetts)  and  developed  the  thesis  that  their  conversations  would
typically raise fairly specific accounts of their respective professional interests.28 Stark
surmises that Shaw probably took at least one of those opportunities to tellMelville about
a related ruling Shaw rendered eight years later in Brown v. Kendall.29 A standard text on
torts  (civil  wrongs  not  involving  a  contract),  for  example,  claims  that  it  “is  now
considered  the  leading  case  establishing  the  necessity  of  proving  negligence  for  the
purpose of imposing liability for accidental injury.” 30
20 The plaintiff sued for injuries to his eye caused by a man who was wielding a stick in
order to stop fight between two dogs owned by plaintiff and defendant respectively. Shaw
ruled that Brown could not recover damages because Kendall was not absolutely liable for
the injuries he caused and was not liable for the eye injury in particular because he was
using ordinary care.  The standard raised by Shaw was that of the “prudent” man in the
ordinary exercise of his work or course of business. The idea of contributory negligence
also arose from this case. Negligence on the part of a plaintiff in a case could seriously
jeopardize any claims he may have against the defendant. Shaw then reaffirmed Farwell in
stating that a person “takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils” of a
job when he accepts employment.  In Brown, both the trial judge and Shaw, writing for the
Supreme  Judicial  Court, agreed  that  the  defense  of  inevitable  accident  went  to  the
adequacy of the defendant’s care under the circumstances. Their difference was one of
degree.  The  trial  judge  thought  the  issue  was  whether  the  defendant  had  exercised
extraordinary care; 31Justice Shaw saw the issue as one of ordinary care--defined as “that
kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use […] the increased
degree  of  care  and  diligence,  which  the  exigency  of  particular  circumstances  might
require,  and  which  men  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence  would  use  under  like
circumstances,  to guard against danger.” Defendants would be liable only if  they are
“chargeable with some fault, negligence, carelessness, or want of prudence.”32 Hence the
fault standard became one of mere “prudence” or “reasonableness”. 
21 Stark aptly notes the frequent recurrence in both “Bartleby” and Shaw’s opinion of the
word “prudent”--“second in importance to ‘prefer.’”33 At the story’s outset, the lawyer
volunteers  the  following  information.  “Imprimis:  I  am  a  man  who,  from  his  youth
upwards, has been filled with a profound conviction that the easiest way of life is the
best” (p. 16). Content to “do a snug business among rich men's bonds, and mortgages, and
title-deeds,” he cherishes his “peace” above the usual “ambitions” and turbulence of his
colleagues at law, who must go to court and face a jury and judge. His acquaintances
consider him “safe” and the late John Jacob Astor, praised him above all for “prudence”
and then “method.” In this introduction to the narrator, the reader already encounters
an interesting self-indictment in the linking of the terms “easiest” and “snug” with the
normally more controlled and reflective stance implicit in the idea of “prudence.”
22 In terms of the depiction of the lawyer-narrator in “Bartleby”, the lawyer decides that
“charity often operates as a vastly wise and prudent principle--a great safeguard to its
possessor”  (52).  The lawyer  seems here  to  have reconciled his  prudential  ethic  with
charity for Bartleby, but the final part of his statement indicates whose best interests his
prudence serves. To him charity is a minor virtue, prudence the cardinal virtue, and he
has  trouble  dealing  with  persons  who  do  not  accommodate  themselves  to  his  own
prudent  behavior.  In  short,  Shaw’s  opinion in Brown v.  Kendall  extols  prudence but
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Melville’s  “Bartleby”,  “by  showing  the  prudent  lawyer’s  ineffective  reaction  to  his
scrivener, exposes its flaws and limits.”34
23 On  its  face  Brown  v.  Kendall  appears  far  removed  from  more  abstract  policy
considerations bearing on nineteenth century American economic jurisprudence. But the
connection is linked to the purpose, evident throughout his judicial career, to encourage
developing industries and businesses. Shaw had propounded the most important rules of
the common law involving railroads, as in Farwell, for example, and almost always decided
in their favor by limiting their liability. Lawrence Friedman--noting the development of
railroads in terms of their benefits in linking cities and tying farms to the city and the
seaports--also describes trains as “wild beasts” roaring through the countryside “killing
livestock, setting fire to crops, smashing passengers and freight.” In his analysis, railroad
law and tort law grew up together and “the two were the same” in a sense:
Every  legal  system  tries  to  redress  harm  done  by  one  person  to  another.  The
industrial  revolution  added  an  appalling  increase  in  dimension.  Its  machines
produced injuries as well as profits and products. The profits were a tempting and
logical fund out of which to pay the costs of the injured. Moreover, the industrial
relationship was impersonal.  No ties  of  blood or  love prevented one cog in the
machine from suing the machine and its owners. But precisely here (to the 19th
century mine) lay the danger.  Lawsuits and damages might injure the health of
precarious  enterprise.  The  machines  were  the  basis  for  economic  growth,  for
national wealth, for the greater of good of society.35
24 Thus, by announcing in Brown v. Kendall that the plaintiff could only have won by proving
that the defendant used less than ordinary care, Shaw established that rule for hundreds
of cases and thereby made it more difficult for persons to win suits against businesses
that had injured them. Having to pay less money for legal damages, businesses could
invest more in expansion --all in the name of the general interest for society as a whole.
25 Shaw’s concern over general policies of social governance extended to criminal law as
well. In Commonwealth v. Mash, Shaw generated a rationale for a bigamy conviction against
a woman who sincerely regarded her absent husband as dead.36 Shaw tacitly conceded
that Mrs. Mash was not blameworthy for entering into the second marriage. Yet that
mattered little, he argued, for preventing bigamy was “essential to the peace of families
and the good order of society…”37 Thus in Shaw’s mind, the social interest in deterring
bigamy justified convicting a morally innocent woman.  In the words of  Prof.  George
Fletcher: “If a judge is inclined to sacrifice morally innocent offenders for the sake of
social control he is also likely to require the victims of socially useful activities to bear
their injuries without compensation.”38
26 Neither  was  the issue of  slavery spared Shaw’s  unflinching devotion to  broad policy
consideration. Shaw freed slaves who were not runaways, because Massachusetts had no
law establishing slavery. He decided these cases in accordance with his opposition to
slavery, which he made public as early as 1820. However, he enforced the Fugitive Slave
Law by returning to their masters all the runaway slaves who appeared before him.39 The
rationale was a perceived need for absolute social control under the guise of “law and
order”. In a more significant case on racial issues, Roberts v. City of Boston, Shaw upheld
the practice of segregation in the Boston school system.40 This case is important because,
according to the opinion in the 1954 Brown v.  Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas
which overturned Roberts, the long-standing doctrine of “separate but equal”--normally
attributed  to  the  1896  Supreme  Court  decision  in  Plessy  v.  Ferguson41--apparently
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originated in Roberts v. City of Boston.”42 Once more, to Shaw’s way of thinking, a well-ordered
society of “prudent” individuals requires strata which must be faithfully adhered to.
 
C. Res ipsa loquitur
27 Under the legal doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the occurrence of an injury implies that the
harm could have been avoided if ordinary care had been used--by extension, blame shifts
in such a way as to diminish concern for social and economic exigencies and takes into
account the victimized individual.  Melville’s richly evocative themes of existence and
alienation apart, “Bartleby” also seems to represent an argument of this sort, meant to
counter Shaw’s prevailing, and cruel, legal fiction of the day. Res ipsa loquitur raises a
presumption of negligence (a strict liability) on the part of the person who caused the
harm and who now bears the burden of proving the act was exercised with appropriate
care. Where unequal access to direct evidence of negligence burdens the plaintiff, as was
the case with the ordinary railroad worker, this doctrine may be used to bring the case to
the jury with an inference of  negligence.  The doctrine of  res  ipsa loquitur could thus
provide  aid  to  the  victimized  who  was  being  compelled  to  “assume  the  risk”  daily
physical sustenance entailed. 
28 This doctrine was itself scarcely new, stemming as it did from medieval English Common
Law. It involved legal notions such as strict liability in trespass actions, dating back to
twelfth century England and articulated in Weaver v.  Ward,  a  1616 case involving the
accidental  discharge  of  firearms--establishing  the  danger  inherent  in  weapons  as
requiring special care in their use, and any ensuing “accidents” thus forming a prima facia
case for tortious negligence.43 Morton J.  Horwitz--citing various American cases circa
1800 where strict liability was still in force--argues that later nineteenth century tort
doctrine--such as that developed by Lemuel Shaw--was hence “deliberately structured to
accommodate the economic interests of emerging industry.”44 
29 Although “Bartleby”’s potential as allusive to the severity of the “assumption of risk”
doctrine has been ably handled by Michael Rogin,45 Brook Thomas,46 Gillian Brown,47 and
notably, Cindy Weinstein in her fine article entitled “Melville, Labor, and the Discourses
of Reception,”48 this article proposes the ancient “it  speaks for itself” legal notion as
thinly veiled in the scrivener’s obdurate refusal to explain, justify or even excuse his
behavior. And as such, it imputes to Melville knowledge of the common law tradition
prior to Shaw’s reversal, and anticipates current theories of strict liability which, despite
pressures from unions and social critics, did not receive Supreme Court approval before
1917.
30 In  “Bartleby”,  therefore,  the  moral  bind the  lawyer-narrator  finds  himself  in  entails
precisely that opposition between an affirmative duty to help a person in distress and the
prevailing  convention  imputing  to  everyone  a  supposed  “freedom”  to  enter  into
contractual employment relations, thereby assuming all attendant job-related risks, or
not--which in that epoch, translated into the “freedom” to be unemployed and to starve.
The lawyer’s attempts at making accommodations fall generally within the context of
prevailing professional standards of composure and dignity, which militate against the
“prudence”  of  compassion.  The  lawyer  consoles  himself  by  readings  of  theologian
Jonathan Edwards and scientist Joseph Priestly (“Edwards on the Will” and “Priestly on
Necessity”)--both having denied the doctrine of free will and encouraging the notion that
history was pre-ordained.49 Again, a prudent shelving of any need to reflect more deeply
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on Bartleby’s condition since, whether the product of choice or destiny, the repercussions
of  Bartleby’s  actions,  in  keeping  with  these  principles,  would  reside  beyond  the
professional interests or duty of the lawyer.
31 Referring to Bartleby’s repeated “preferences” (phrased generally as: “I would prefer not
to,”)  along with his  final  statement on his  condition in the Tombs:  “I  know where I
am”(72),  Liane Norman proposes that what Bartleby is really saying is:  “I  know your
freedom and prosperity and I want nothing to do with them. They did not permit me to
choose.”50 In this case, Bartleby has not exercised a free choice against “your freedom and
prosperity” as much as expressed the awareness that he may never know freedom or
prosperity because of the obstacles placed by society--which the community justifies in
terms of imputing to its members the “assumption of risk” associated with the workaday
world. The “freedom” alluded to is that very double-edged “freedom of contract” flowing
from the “assumption of risk” suffusing Shaw’s rulings. And the scrivener’s unwillingness
to elaborate on justifications for his conduct amount to the equivalent of “Open your
eyes--the thing speaks for itself.” An exchange between narrator and scrivener reveals
Bartleby’s  impatience  with  the  absurdity  of  such  interrogations:  “And  what  is  the
reason?” asks the lawyer when Bartleby reveals his “preference” to stop all work entirely.
“Do you not see the reason for yourself?” the scrivener answers (52). And as the reader
knows,  the  lawyer  does  not,  can  not  “see  the  reason.”  In  fact,  in  keeping  with  the
professional standards of the day and correlate dictates of  “prudence” informing the
ethics of legal practice, he ought not.
 
D. Shaw’s “still more unfortunate Colt”
32 About two-thirds of the way along in the tale, Melville introduces an extended allusion to
the Colt-Adams murder case--explicable possibly in terms Melville was particularly privy.
Commonwealth v. Roger came down in 1844, one year after the famous English M'Naghten
Rule, which holds that the defense proves insanity and thus avoids criminal liability if it
can show that the alleged criminal did not know the nature and quality of his or her act.51
Stark describes the M'Naghten Rule as the dominant conception of legal insanity until well
into the twentieth century, when the Durham Rule (mental illness is the test of insanity)
superseded  it.  This  doctrine  propounds  a  purely  rational  test:  insanity  is  a  lack  of
knowledge. In contrast, Shaw's opinion in Roger proposed a volitional test because he
defined insanity as victimization by an irresistible impulse, a definition that some later
courts adopted. In 1850, six years later, Shaw held in Commonwealth v. Webster that if
the state in a murder trial proves intent beyond a reasonable doubt and the defense
proves  no  extenuating  circumstances  (an  excuse  or  justification  that  would  show
innocence or reduce a charge from murder to manslaughter), the malice necessary to
establish murder is shown as a matter of law (that is, the court will so mandate the jury's
decision).52Intent thus came to be virtually equivalent to the “malice aforethought” that
had for some time been the mens rea (mental element) that along with an actus reus (act)
and a causal connection to the death constituted murder. 
33 This rule ostensibly made the defendant’s task very difficult--precisely because it entails
an assumption: an assumption of “intent to do harm” on the part of the defendant.  One
need  only  keep  in  mind  the  collateral  absence  of such  an  assumption  (and  a
corresponding shifting of  the burden of  proof to the plaintiff)  in the industry-related
“assumption of risk” doctrine, to note the inconsistency--as well as the obvious prejudice
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vis-à-vis the financial capabilities of the plaintiff/defendant: in a railroad case, a plaintiff
must already be wealthy to recover damages from the company--since he/she bears the
burden of proving negligence;  the defendant in a murder case,  on the other hand, if
sufficiently  of  means,  can  avoid the  presumption  of  guilt  by  establishing  “excuse”  or
“justification.”53 In other words, as in cases involving railroad companies, the wealthy
would emerge unscathed.
34 The Colt-Adams murder case had caused a sensation in 1841 and 1842--not incidentally,
prior  to  Shaw’s  landmark ruling in  Rogers.  The lurid  aspects  of  the  crime itself,  the
unusual publicity provided by the emerging sensational press, doubts about the justice of
the decision to hang Colt, and the curious denouement which substituted suicide by knife
for the hangman's noose, combined to make an impression which lingered in the minds
of some for many decades after the event. In 1841, an attorney named John C. Colt was
accused  of  having  bludgeoned  Samuel  Adams  to  death  with  a  hatchet  in  his  own
Broadway office.  Adams,  whose corpse was later  found crated to be shipped to New
Orleans, was a printer who had come to Colt to collect a debt. The body was discovered,
and  the  ensuing  trial,  conviction,  sentencing,  execution,  etc.  produced  an  almost
unprecedented sensation. The New York Daily Tribune printed a daily account of trial
proceedings, including a graphic confession written by Colt and read to the court by his
attorney.  Colt  was  found  dead,  apparently  a  suicide,  shortly  before  his  scheduled
execution. 
35 There exist differing versions of the event. According to diarist George Templeton Strong:
“The possibilities of premeditation, accidental slaying in the heat of quarrel, and self-
defense were debated in the course of the trial. The fact of Colt's killing Adams was not,
except at the very outset, in question.”54 The United States Magazine and Democratic Review
took a more sympathetic position: “Colt's version of the affair ascribed the bruised marks
on his  neck,  to  Adams's  throttling  clutch  in  their  encounter;  and  he  denied  having
personally  assisted in carrying down the stairs  the box which was heavy with those
hideous contents […]” Apparently testimony to this effect was available at the outset of
trial, but owing to the prevailing rules of evidence was regarded as immaterial:
In  the first  place,  is  the  offered  testimony  of  a  witness  of  unimpeachable
respectability,  going  to  sustain  Colt's  statement  on  a  point  on  which  it  was
contradicted, and which became one of not immaterial moment during the course
of the trial, although its importance was not perceived in its earlier stage, by the
counsel  who rejected  it  as  unnecessary,  and  thus  caused  the  witness  to  absent
himself from the city […] The materiality of the point in question may be a matter
for difference of opinion. It is certain that, directly or indirectly, it told very hard
against him at the time of the trial.55
36 The narrator sees Colt as more unfortunate than the murdered Adams--the irony arising
possibly from the fact that had Shaw presided, his reformulation of the burden of proving
Colt’s guilt might have resulted in an acquittal. Gale suggests that when Melville alluded
to the murder of Adams by Colt he may also have had in mind two other murders: the
killing in self-defense of Charles Austin in 1806 by Thomas O. Selfridge, a law-partner of
Shaw’s, and the famous murder of George Parkman by Harvard chemistry professor John
W. Webster, who was tried in 1850 before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
presided over by Judge Shaw.56 Parkman had been dismembered and in the absence of a
clear  corpus  delicti --for  the  physical  identification  of  the  headless  corpse  of  George
Parkman rested on dubious legal grounds--the prosecution directed attention to the black
and shaded portions of the skeletal pieces that were found.  Prof. Halttunen maintains
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that the tentative quality of the evidence rendered the jury’s decision, in addition to the
entire conduct of the trial, as publicly questionable and prompted a number of specific
legal challenges to Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's “treatment of burden of proof concerning
corpus delicti, his presentation of the law of circumstantial evidence, and the extreme bias
of his summation of evidence in his charge to the jury.”57 
37 After Webster had been sentenced to die for his crime,  he wrote a confession which
acknowledged that he had killed Parkman but claimed that he had done so in a burst of
anger, without premeditation; he was guilty, in other words, not of first-degree murder
but of manslaughter. Hundreds of letters to the governor pleaded for a reprieve, but he
ignored  them,  and  Webster  was  duly  executed.  And  here,  one  can  imagine  Shaw’s
consternation over the belated confession,  the elements of  which would have,  in his
rationale, sufficed to charge the jury to weigh the evidence differently (as per Webster and
Roger),  thereby  sparing  the  defendant’s  life--which  would  have  been  consistent  with
Shaw’s general policies favoring the upper classes (in this case, a Harvard Professor).
38 Melville  understood Shaw and his  own financial  dependence  on him,  as  well  as  the
unutterable  truths  implicit  in  their  conflicting  paradigms  of  dignity  and  discipline.
Certainly,  for  his  day,  Shaw was  a  paragon  of  judicial  virtue--provided  one  did  not
question the political and economic presuppositions informing that particular era. Upon
close examination and due reflection, Melville’s genius penetrated this harsh reality and
revealed itself to be inconsolably bound both to the exigencies of the quotidian as well as
to the dignity and discipline so integral to the work of an artist. The sole compromise
turning on the wish not to state the obvious, res ipsa loquitur ,  or not to speak at all--
presaging the near total absence of literary output which was to mark the second half of
Melville’s life: 
“Bartleby!”
“I know you,” he said, without looking round--“and I want nothing to say to you.”
“It was not I that brought you here, Bartleby,” said I, keenly pained at his implied
suspicion.  “And to  you,  this  should  not  be  so  vile  a  place.  Nothing reproachful
attaches to you by being here. And see, it is not so sad a place as one might think.
Look, there is the sky, and here is the grass.”
“I know where I am.” (72)
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